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Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing
- A. Avizienis, J. Laprie, B. Randell, C. Landwehr
- Computer ScienceIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure…
The aim is to explicate a set of general concepts, of relevance across a wide range of situations and, therefore, helping communication and cooperation among a number of scientific and technical communities, including ones that are concentrating on particular types of system, of system failures, or of causes of systems failures.
- C. Landwehr
- Computer ScienceCommunications of the ACM
- 28 January 2019
Retracing the pivotal privacy and security-related events and ensuing issues from the past year and identifying the key players and issues to watch out for.
A taxonomy of computer program security flaws
This survey provides a taxonomy for computer program security flaws, with an Appendix that documents 50 actual security flaws that provide a good introduction to the characteristics of security flaws and how they can arise.
Formal Models for Computer Security
- C. Landwehr
- Computer ScienceCSUR
- 1 September 1981
The need for formal security models is described, the structure and operation of military security controls are described, how automation has affected security problems is considered, and possible models that have been proposed and applied to date are surveyed.
Towards an Analysis of Onion Routing Security
- P. Syverson, G. Tsudik, M. Reed, C. Landwehr
- Computer ScienceWorkshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and…
A security analysis of Onion Routing, an application independent infrastructure for traffic-analysis-resistant and anonymous Internet connections, and an overview of the current system design, definitions of security goals and new adversary models are presented.
A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples
This paper provides a taxonomy for computer program security flaws together with an appendix that carefully documents 50 actual security flaws that provide a good introduction to the characteristics of security flaws and how they can arise.
Avoiding the Top 10 Software Security Design Flaws
Because the authors, contributors, and publisher are eager to engage the broader community in open discussion, analysis, and debate regarding a vital issue of common interest, this document is…
A security model for military message systems
The message system application is introduced, the problems of using the Bell-LaPadula model in real applications are described, and the security model for a family of military message systems is formulated.
- C. Landwehr
- Computer ScienceInternational Journal of Information Security
- 1 August 2001
This paper reviews major concepts and principles of computer security as it stands today and strives not to delve deeply into specific technical areas such as operating system security, access control, network security, intrusion detection, and so on, but to paint the topic with a broad brush.
On Access Checking in Capability-Based Systems
The paper shows why this problem arises and provides a taxonomy of capability-based designs and identifies a class of designs that cannot enforce the Bell-LaPadula rules and two designs that do allow their enforcement.