• Publications
  • Influence
Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach
TLDR
This new edition of Howson and Urbach's account of scientific method from the Bayesian standpoint includes chapter exercises and extended material on topics such as regression analysis, distributions densities, randomisation and conditionalisation. Expand
Hume's problem: induction and the justification of belief
Introduction 1. Hume's Argument 2. Reliabilism 3. Realism and the No-Miracles Argument 4. Probabilism 5. Deductivisim 6. The Naturalistic Fallacy 7. 'A New Species of Logic' 8. The Logic ofExpand
The Logic of Bayesian Probability
TLDR
Today it is customary to follow Savage and show that suitable axioms for preference determine a reflexive and transitive ordering ‘at least as probable as’ and thence, given a further assumption about how finely the state space can be partitioned, a unique probability function. Expand
Theories of Probability
My title is intended to recall Terence Fine's excellent survey, Theories of Probability [1973]. I shall consider some developments that have occurred in the intervening years, and try to place someExpand
BAYESIANISM AND SUPPORT BY NOVEL FACTS*
  • C. Howson
  • Philosophy
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1 September 1984
Gardner in his [1982] assesses the ability of a number of methodological theories to explain the phenomenon, or alleged phenomenon, of the high supportive power, relative to some hypothesis, of anyExpand
The ‘Old Evidence’ Problem
  • C. Howson
  • Philosophy
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1 December 1991
This paper offers an answer to Glymour's ‘old evidence’ problem for Bayesian confirmation theory, and assesses some of the objections, in particular those recently aired by Chihara, that have beenExpand
De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence
  • C. Howson
  • Mathematics
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1 March 2008
Many people believe that there is a Dutch Book argument establishing that the principle of countable additivity is a condition of coherence. De Finetti himself did not, but for reasons that are atExpand
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