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International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices
Abstract This paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non-tradable emission allowances by non-cooperative countries. I find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to lessExpand
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The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy
We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibriumExpand
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Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes
Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardizedExpand
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On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
  • C. Helm
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • Int. J. Game Theory
  • 25 October 2001
This paper analyzes a game in coalitional form that is derived from a simple economy with multilateral externalities and shows that the game is balanced. Expand
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Patch reef development in the florigemma-Bank Member (Oxfordian) from the Deister Mts (NW Germany): a type example for Late Jurassic coral thrombolite thickets
Small reefal bioconstructions that developed in lagoonal settings are widespread in a few horizons of the Late Jurassic (Oxfordian) succession of the Korallenoolith Formation, exposed southwest ofExpand
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Self-Enforcing Agreements and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Rights
The success of any international climate change agreement depends on abatement targets and the incentives for countries to participate. We demonstrate that international emission trading is effectiveExpand
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Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers
We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, e.g. electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduceExpand
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Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
Abstract We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept ofExpand
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The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept
The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefitExpand
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