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A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
A surprisingly simple rule is described that is a good approximation for all graphs that are analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k.
Evolutionary dynamics on graphs
This work determines the fixation probability of mutants, and characterize those graphs for which fixation behaviour is identical to that of a homogeneous population, and shows that the outcome of evolutionary games can depend entirely on the structure of the underlying graph.
Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game
Understanding the mechanisms that can lead to the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Among the various attempts at constructing a theory of cooperation,…
Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
The results caution against the common belief that spatial structure is necessarily beneficial for cooperative behaviour, and show that no such general predictions can be made for the effects of spatial structure in the snowdrift game.
The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors
This work analyzes the continuous snowdrift game, in which cooperative investments are costly but yield benefits to others as well as to the cooperator, to find out how large asymmetries in cooperative investments can evolve.
Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Neither other-regarding tendencies or preferences for reciprocity and equity, nor group selection or prescriptions from higher authorities, are necessary for the emergence and stability of rudimentary forms of sanctioning institutions regulating common pool resources and enforcing collaborative efforts.
Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors.
Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games
This work presents a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity that shows that in voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist and shows that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms.
Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas.
Reward and punishment
- K. Sigmund, C. Hauert, M. Nowak
- Psychology, BiologyProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences…
- 11 September 2001
The analysis suggests that reputation is essential for fostering social behavior among selfish agents, and that it is considerably more effective with punishment than with reward.