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What Moore's Paradox Is About
On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, inExpand
Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility
  • C. D. Almeida
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 1 September 2012
The paper argues that skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. Expand
Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons
It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication.Expand
Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination
The effort to understand Peter D. Klein’s work on (so-called) Cartesian skepticism is simply not optional to anyone wishing to become familiar with state-of-the-art scholarship on the problem. NearlyExpand
Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism
Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However,Expand