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Vaccination and the theory of games.

  • C. BauchD. Earn
  • Medicine
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences…
  • 7 September 2004
TLDR
It is shown that a formal game theoretical analysis of the problem of whether a sufficient proportion of the population is already immune, either naturally or by vaccination, leads to new insights that help to explain human decision-making with respect to vaccination.
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Imitation dynamics predict vaccinating behaviour

  • C. Bauch
  • Biology
    Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological…
  • 22 August 2005
TLDR
A game dynamic model is developed in which individuals adopt strategies according to an imitation dynamic (a learning process), and base vaccination decisions on disease prevalence and perceived risks of vaccines and disease.
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Lean Product Development: Making Waste Transparent

Stray dog population demographics in Jodhpur, India following a population control/rabies vaccination program.

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Transients and attractors in epidemics

  • C. BauchD. Earn
  • Economics
    Proceedings of the Royal Society of London…
  • 7 August 2003
TLDR
It is shown that an additional (perturbative) analysis of the model can account for all the observed incidence patterns by predicting how stochastically sustained transient dynamics should be manifested in these systems.
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Dynamically Modeling SARS and Other Newly Emerging Respiratory Illnesses: Past, Present, and Future

TLDR
This work reconcile discrepancies between published estimates of the basic reproductive number R0 for SARS (a crucial epidemiologic parameter), discusses insights regarding SARS control measures that have emerged uniquely from a modeling approach, and argues that high priorities for future modeling should include informing quarantine policy and better understanding the impact of population heterogeneity on transmission patterns.
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Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy

TLDR
A synthesis of game theory and epidemic modeling that formalizes this conflict between self-interest and group interest and shows that voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-optimal level and results in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack.
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Statistical physics of vaccination

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Evolutionary Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine How Vaccine Scares Unfold

TLDR
A model based on evolutionary game theory that captures feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning and feedback is analyzed, which could help predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts.
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Comparing influenza vaccine efficacy against mismatched and matched strains: a systematic review and meta-analysis

TLDR
The TIV and LAIV vaccines can provide cross protection against non-matching circulating strains, and the point estimates for VE were different for matching versus non- matching strains, with overlapping CIs.
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