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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology the authors require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.
Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong
Computers are already approving financial transactions, controlling electrical supplies, and driving trains. Soon, service robots will be taking care of the elderly in their homes, and military…
Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent
The ethical disputes are surveyed, the possibility of a ‘moral Turing Test’ is considered and the computational difficulties accompanying the different types of approach are assessed.
Artificial Morality: Top-down, Bottom-up, and Hybrid Approaches
A principal goal of the discipline of artificial morality is to design artificial agents to act as if they are moral agents. Intermediate goals of artificial morality are directed at building into AI…
The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Developed Dynamic Reference Work
The fiscal challenges posed by the desire to maintain free or low-cost access to the contents of the SEP are discussed, and technological challenges posed to stay abreast of technological developments in document markup are considered.
Recognizing group cognition
Animal Concepts Revisited: the use of Self- Monitoring as an Empirical Approach
- C. Allen
- 1 September 1999
Many psychologists and philosophers believe that the close correlation between human language and human concepts makes the attribution of concepts to nonhuman animals highly questionable. I argue for…
Why Machine Ethics?
Machine ethics is an emerging field that seeks to implement moral decision-making faculties in computers and robots that violate ethical standards as a matter of course.
Machine morality: bottom-up and top-down approaches for modelling human moral faculties
The value and limitations inherent in the architectures for morally intelligent agents fall within two broad approaches: the top-down imposition of ethical theories, and the bottom-up building of systems that aim at goals or standards which may or may not be specified in explicitly theoretical terms.