This paper proposes a framework for planning under uncertainty given a partially known initial state and a set of actions having nondeterministic (disjunctive) eeects, some being more possible (normal) than the others. The problem, henceforth called possibilistic planning problem, is represented in an extension of the STRIPS formalism in which the initial… (More)
We address the issue, in cognitive agents, of possible loss of previous information, which later might turn out to be correct when new information becomes available. To this aim, we propose a framework for changing the agent's mind without erasing forever previous information, thus allowing its recovery in case the change turns out to be wrong. In this new… (More)
We propose a general framework to represent changes in the mental state of a rational agent due to the acquisition of new information and/or to the arising of new desires; fundamental postulates and properties of the function which generates the goal set are also provided.
A rational agent adopts (or changes) its goals when new information (beliefs) becomes available or its desires (e.g., tasks it is supposed to carry out) change. In conventional approaches to goal generation in which a goal is considered as a " particular " desire, a goal is adopted if and only if all conditions leading to its generation are satisfied. It is… (More)
A possibilistic approach of planning under uncertainty has been developed recently. It applies to problems in which the initial state is partially known and the actions have graded nondeterministic eeects, some being more possible (normal) than the others. The uncertainty on states and eeects of actions is represented by possibility distributions. The paper… (More)
We propose an integrated theoretical framework, grounded in possibility theory, to account for all the aspects involved in representing and changing beliefs, representing and generating justified desires , and selecting goals based on current and uncertain beliefs about the world, and the preferences of the agent. Beliefs and desires of a cognitive agent… (More)
We study the interplay between argumentation and belief revision within the MAS framework. When an agent uses an argument to persuade another one, he must consider not only the proposition supported by the argument, but also the overall impact of the argument on the beliefs of the addressee. Different arguments lead to different belief revisions by the… (More)