This paper is an exploratory study on the interconnection economics of All-IP networks. To understand the economics of the yet-to-be-realized All-IP networks, this paper begins with discussing three important features of current IP networks: packet switching, receiver benefit, and two-sidedness. It then develops simple models of interconnection for basic… (More)
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal… (More)
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators' licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost reduction, and even negative royalty rates.
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. " Steeper " securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two highest valuations, yet reduce effort incentives. In view… (More)
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