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It is well-known that the Vertex Cover problem is in P on bipartite graphs, however; the computational complexity of the Partial Vertex Cover problem on bipartite graphs is open. In this paper, we first show that the Partial Vertex Cover problem is NP-hard on bipartite graphs. We then identify an interesting special case of bipartite graphs, for which the… (More)

We consider a process called Group Network Formation Game, which represents the scenario when strategic agents are building a network together. In our game, agents can have extremely varied connectivity requirements, and attempt to satisfy those requirements by purchasing links in the network. We show a variety of results about equilibrium properties in… (More)

We study the survivable version of the game theoretic network formation model known as the Connection Game, originally introduced in [5]. In this model, players attempt to connect to a common source node in a network by purchasing edges, and sharing their costs with other players. We introduce the survivable version of this game, where each player desires 2… (More)

We consider the existence of Partition Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games. Super-strong equilibrium, where no subset of players has an incentive to change their strategies collectively, does not always exist in such games. We show, however, that partition equilibrium (introduced in (Feldman and Tennenholtz in SAGT, pp. 48–59, 2009) to model coalitions… (More)

In this paper, we formulate and study a capacity allocation game between a set of receivers (players) that are interested in receiving multicast data (video/multimedia) being streamed from a server through a multihop network. We consider fractional multicast streaming, where the multicast stream from the source (origin-server) to any particular receiver… (More)

We consider cut games where players want to cut themselves off from different parts of a network. These games arise when players want to secure themselves from areas of potential infection. For the game-theoretic version of Multiway Cut, we prove that the price of stability is 1, i.e., there exists a Nash equilibrium as good as the centralized optimum. For… (More)

Risk analysis has been used to manage the security of systems for several decades. However, its use has been limited to offline risk computation and manual response. In contrast, we use risk computation to drive changes in an operating system's security configuration. This allows risk management to occur in real time and reduces the window of exposure to… (More)

- Elliot Anshelevich, Jon Kleinberg, Bugra Caskurlu, Onkar Bhardwaj, Gitakrishnan Ramadurai, Ting Xie +4 others
- 2012

Research Interests My interests center on the design and analysis of algorithms, focusing mainly on algorithmic game theory and approximation algorithms. I am especially interested in algorithms for large decentralized networks, including networks involving strategic agents. In particular, I am interested in: • Strategic agents in networks, and influencing… (More)

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