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We consider a process called Group Network Formation Game, which represents the scenario when strategic agents are building a network together. In our game, agents can have extremely varied connectivity requirements, and attempt to satisfy those requirements by purchasing links in the network. We show a variety of results about equilibrium properties in(More)
We consider the existence of Partition Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games. Super-strong equilibrium, where no subset of players has an incentive to change their strategies collectively, does not always exist in such games. We show, however, that partition equilibrium (introduced in (Feldman and Tennenholtz in SAGT, pp. 48–59, 2009) to model coalitions(More)
We consider cut games where players want to cut themselves off from different parts of a network. These games arise when players want to secure themselves from areas of potential infection. For the game-theoretic version of Multiway Cut, we prove that the price of stability is 1, i.e., there exists a Nash equilibrium as good as the centralized optimum. For(More)
In this paper, we formulate and study a capacity allocation game between a set of receivers (players) that are interested in receiving multicast data (video/multimedia) being streamed from a server through a multihop network. We consider fractional multicast streaming, where the multicast stream from the source (origin-server) to any particular receiver(More)
Risk analysis has been used to manage the security of systems for several decades. However, its use has been limited to offline risk computation and manual response. In contrast, we use risk computation to drive changes in an operating system's security configuration. This allows risk management to occur in real time and reduces the window of exposure to(More)
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