Bruno Blanchet

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We show that abstract interpretation-based static program analysis can be made efficient and precise enough to formally verify a class of properties for a family of large programs with few or no false alarms. This is achieved by refinement of a general purpose static analyzer and later adaptation to particular programs of the family by the end-user through(More)
In the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behaviors have been quite effective. We aim to expand the scope of those methods and tools. We focus on proving equivalences P/spl ap/Q in which P and Q are two processes that differ only in the choice of some terms. These equivalences arise often in applications. We show(More)
We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security proto-<lb>cols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our<lb>technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the<lb>protocol, and it is efficient in practice. It significantly extends a previous technique<lb>for the(More)
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games; these games are formalized in a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus. Our tool provides a generic(More)
We study and further develop two language-based techniques for analyzing security protocols. One is based on a typed process calculus; the other, on untyped logic programs. Both focus on secrecy properties. We contribute to these two techniques, in particular by extending the former with a flexible, generic treatment of many cryptographic operations. We(More)
We present a new automatic technique for proving strong secrecy for security protocols. Strong secrecy means that an adversary cannot see any difference when the value of the secret changes. Our technique relies on an automatic translation of the protocol into Horn clauses, and a resolution algorithm on the clauses. It requires important extensions with(More)
We report on a successful preliminary experience in the design and implementation of a special-purpose Abstract Interpretation based static program analyzer for the verification of safety critical embedded real-time software. The analyzer is both precise (zero false alarm in the considered experiment) and efficient (less than one minute of analysis for(More)
We develop a typed process calculus for security protocols in which types convey secrecy properties. We focus on asymmetric communication primitives, especially on public-key encryption. These present special dif-culties, partly because they rely on related capabilities (e.g., \public" and \private" keys) with diierent levels of secrecy and scopes.