Brian Knight

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Analyses of the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered by the problem that economic outcomes also influence elections. We sidestep these problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes in expectations about the likely winner during Election Day. Analyzing high frequency financial(More)
We analyze a novel lobbying channel: firms attempting to influence businessmen-politicians through business proxies. In particular, when a politician controls a business, firms shift their spending towards the politician's business in the hopes of securing favorable regulation. We investigate this channel in Italy where government officials are not required(More)
Well-designed regulation can check politically driven inefficiencies, but it can also exacerbate distortions if politicians capture the regulators. We examine the consequences of strengthening India's electricity transmission regulatory structure for groundwater extraction , where electricity is the key input, and we find evidence of regulatory capture by(More)
How does political competition shape legislative influence over regulatory decision making? This study shows that in a democracy with pervasive patronage politics, political competition can undermine the strengthening of regulations due to heightened incentives to influence regulators. We propose a probabilistic voting model in which politicians compete for(More)
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