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Article history: Throughout the developing Received 11 January 2008 Received in revised form 6 September 2008 Accepted 22 September 2008 Available online xxxx

- Brian Baisa, Amanda G. Gregg, Yingni Guo, Jun Ishii
- 2012

I study the canonical private value auction model for a single good without the quasilinearity restriction. I assume only that bidders are risk averse and the indivisible good for sale is a normal good. I show that removing quasilinearity leads to qualitatively different solutions to the auction design problem. Expected revenue is no longer maximized using… (More)

- Daniel Fragiadakis, Peter Troyan, +11 authors Alex Wolitzky
- 2013

Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment… (More)

We study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets. Before bidding, a bidder decides how much money she will borrow. Bidders incur a cost to borrowing. We show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first-price, second-price and all-pay auction. The all-pay auction gives higher… (More)

- Brian Baisa
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2016

I examine bid behavior in uniform-price auctions and multi-unit Vickrey auctions, without the standard quasilinearity restriction on bidder preferences. Instead of assuming quasilinearity, I assume that bidders have weakly positive wealth effects, i.e. the goods are normal goods. My setting nests quasilinearity, but also allows for budget constraints,… (More)

- Brian Baisa
- 2017

In this Appendix, I give two positive implementation results that define the boundaries of Theorem 3 in my paper, E cient Auctions for Normal Goods. The paper studies e cient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and positive wealth e↵ects. Theorem 3 states that if bidders have singledimensional types, then there is… (More)

- Brian Baisa
- 2015

Consider an auction for a divisible good where bidders have private budgets. Recent work by Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan (2012) shows there is no individually rational dominant strategy mechanism that implements a Pareto efficient outcome and satisfies weak budget balance when bidders have private budgets. My main result shows that when bidders have… (More)

I study efficient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests… (More)

- Brian Baisa, Nicholas Barberis, +10 authors Peter Troyan
- 2012

This paper studies independent private value auctions where bidders have rank dependent preferences. We derive equilibrium bidding functions for the first price, second price and all pay auctions. By placing basic assumptions on the probability weighting function, we show that with sufficiently many bidders, the all pay auction yields greater expected… (More)

I study e cient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and e ciency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests cases… (More)

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