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Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment(More)
We study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets. Before bidding, a bidder decides how much money she will borrow. Bidders incur a cost to borrowing. We show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first-price, second-price and all-pay auction. The all-pay auction gives higher(More)
I examine bid behavior in uniform-price auctions and multi-unit Vickrey auctions, without the standard quasilinearity restriction on bidder preferences. Instead of assuming quasilinearity, I assume that bidders have weakly positive wealth effects, i.e. the goods are normal goods. My setting nests quasilinearity, but also allows for budget constraints,(More)
In this Appendix, I give two positive implementation results that define the boundaries of Theorem 3 in my paper, E cient Auctions for Normal Goods. The paper studies e cient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and positive wealth e↵ects. Theorem 3 states that if bidders have singledimensional types, then there is(More)
I study efficient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests(More)
I study e cient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and e ciency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests cases(More)
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