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Your botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover

This paper reports on efforts to take control of the Torpig botnet and study its operations for a period of ten days, which provides a new understanding of the type and amount of personal information that is stolen by botnets.
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The Underground Economy of Spam: A Botmaster's Perspective of Coordinating Large-Scale Spam Campaigns

A comprehensive analysis of a large-scale botnet from the botmaster's perspective is presented, that highlights the intricacies involved in orchestrating spam campaigns such as the quality of email address lists, the effectiveness of IP-based blacklisting, and the reliability of bots.
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FIRE: FInding Rogue nEtworks

Fire is presented, a novel system to identify and expose organizations and ISPs that demonstrate persistent, malicious behavior and can be used to pinpoint and to track the activity of rogue organizations, preventing criminals from establishing strongholds on the Internet.
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Highly resilient peer-to-peer botnets are here: An analysis of Gameover Zeus

Through a detailed analysis of this new Zeus variant, this work demonstrates the high resilience of state of the art peer-to-peer botnets in general, and of peer- to-peer Zeus in particular.
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SoK: P2PWNED - Modeling and Evaluating the Resilience of Peer-to-Peer Botnets

A formal graph model is introduced to capture the intrinsic properties and fundamental vulnerabilities of P2P botnets and can be used to assist security researchers in evaluating mitigation strategies against current and future P2p botnets.
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Understanding fraudulent activities in online ad exchanges

A detailed view of how one of the largest ad exchanges operates and the associated security issues from the vantage point of a member ad network is presented.
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The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software

An economic model is presented that demonstrates that fake AV companies are actively monitoring the refunds (chargebacks) that customers demand from their credit card providers, which can potentially be leveraged by vigilant payment processors and credit card companies to identify and ban fraudulent firms.
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Two years of short URLs internet measurement: security threats and countermeasures

Despite short URLs being a significant, new security risk, in accordance with the reports resulting from the observation of the overall phishing and spamming activity, it is found that only a relatively small fraction of users ever encountered malicious short URLs.
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Analysis of a Botnet Takeover

The authors report on their efforts to take control of the Torpig botnet and study its operations for a period of 10 days, during which they observed more than 180,000 infections and recorded almost 70 Gbytes of data that the bots collected.
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P 2 PWNED : Modeling and Evaluating the Resilience of Peer-to-Peer Botnets

A formal graph model is introduced to capture the intrinsic properties and fundamental vulnerabilities of P2P botnets and can be used to assist security researchers in evaluating mitigation strategies against current and future P2p botnets.
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