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Recent auction theory suggests that multi-unit uniform-price auctions, as used by the U.S. Treasury for debt sales, produce incentives that may cause bidders to bid less than their true valuations, resulting in inefficient allocations and reduced revenue. In this paper, we present the results of a field experiment in which we auction nearly $10,000 worth of(More)
AIM To evaluate the efficacy and safety of replacing latanoprost with another prostaglandin analogue (PGA) in patients with glaucoma or ocular hypertension requiring additional intraocular pressure (IOP) lowering while on latanoprost. METHODS Prospective, randomised, investigator-masked, multicentre clinical trial. Patients on latanoprost 0.005%(More)
We examine the theoretical properties of the proposed auction format for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment. The format was used in a pilot auction in November 2009 covering nine cities and is planned for use in 100 cities in 2010. Two unusual features of the Medicare auction are 1) non-binding bids and 2) a median pricing rule in which winners are paid the(More)
A s the Government comes to grips with rising deficits, there is a bigger economic tsunami lurking in the background—many tens of trillions in unfunded Medicare costs. 1 Innovations are desperately needed to contain healthcare costs and avoid fiscal disaster. One thing in need of change is Medicare' s pricing of equipment and supplies using 25-year-old rate(More)
The effects on ex ante optima of a lag in seeing monetary realizations are studied using a matching model of money. The main new ingredient in the model is meetings in which producers have more information than consumers. A consequence is that increases in the amount of money that occur with small enough probability can have negative impact effects on(More)
This paper examines a two stage game where information is endogenously acquired prior to single object common value auctions. In stage one, bidders choose the quality of their information service. Stage two then examines strategic behavior in bonus bid and royalty rate auctions, conditional on stage one information. Comparisons are drawn between the(More)
O ur Economists' Voice column summarized the severe problems with the current and proposed Medicare auctions. The column was based on a careful reading and analysis of the auction rules. Since that time we and other auction experts have studied the Medicare auctions with theory, experiment, and the limited amount of field data that the Centers for Medicare(More)
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