Brendan Daley

Learn More
We study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information about the value of a privately-informed seller's asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers. We characterize the unique equilibrium in a continuous-time framework. The equilibrium involves periods of no trade or market failure. The no-trade period ends in one of two ways: either enough good(More)
A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to(More)
We consider an auction environment where the object can be sold with usage restrictions that generate direct bene…ts to the seller but lower buyers' valuations. In this environment, sellers such as the FCC have used 'contingent re-auctions,'o¤ering the restricted object with a reserve price, but re-auctioning it without the restrictions if the reserve is(More)
We develop a dynamic multi-dimensional signaling model of campaign finance in which candidates can signal their ability by enacting policy and/or by raising and spending campaign funds, both of which are costly. Our model departs from the existing literature in that candidates do not exchange policy influence for campaign contributions, rather, they must(More)
This paper seeks to make two contributions. First, we propose and analyze a tractable model of strategic play in which players behave as if their expectations about their opponents' behavior vary with their own choices. We refer to this nonstandard updating as magical thinking. The model provides a unified view of documented behavior in a range of(More)
If managers, creditors, or other firm counterparties use stock prices when making decisions, short sellers may attempt to manipulate prices, inducing decisions that reduce firm value. However, an informed long-term shareholder has a natural incentive to ensure that prices send the right message so that the value of his existing stake is not harmed. While he(More)
We analyze an environment in which bidders' private values change over time due to both private investments and exogenous shocks. We demonstrate that a highly-decentralized mechanism achieves efficiency. The mechanism requires a stage of costly public announcements (i.e., signaling) to induce efficient investment. For this reason, an equilibrium selection(More)
I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric(More)
We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values. A trade of one asset (or lack thereof) can provide information about the value of other assets. The information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium. We show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria(More)