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The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
If war results from disagreement about relative strength, then it ends when opponents learn enough about each other. Learning occurs when information is revealed by strategically manipulableExpand
Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace
Part I. Coercion and Credibility: 1. Introduction 2. Commitment and signalling in coercive bargaining Part II. A Theory of Military Threats: 3. A model of military threats 4. Comparing theExpand
Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs
Domestic audience costs can help leaders establish credible commitments by tying their hands. Most studies assume these costs without explaining how they arise. I link domestic audience costs to theExpand
The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common rationalist explanation is that war results from private information and incentives to misrepresentExpand
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises
Military mobilization simultaneously sinks costs, because it must be paid for regardless of the outcome, and ties hands, because it increases the probability of winning should war occur. ExistingExpand
Trust and Mistrust in International Relations
Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. By Andrew H. Kydd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 284p. $39.50. That cooperation is at best difficult and at worst impossible in theExpand
The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large rapid shift of power renders unbelievable a rising state's promise to compensate its declin- ing opponent, causing theExpand
Feigning Weakness
Abstract In typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war, strongExpand
How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace
The new theories of endogenous war termination generally predict that initiators would tend to do badly the longer the war, that information acquired during the war would outweigh informationExpand
The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces
Armed forces strong enough to protect the state also pose a threat to the state. We develop a model that distills this “Guardianship Dilemma” to its barest essentials, and show that the seeminglyExpand