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Many search and security games played on a graph can be modeled as normal-form zero-sum games with strategies consisting of sequences of actions. The size of the strategy space provides a computational challenge when solving these games. This complexity is tackled either by using the compact representation of sequential strategies and linear programming ,… (More)

We study the problem of a mobile agent trying to cross an area patrolled by a mobile adversary. The transiting agent aims to choose its route so as to minimize the probability of hostile encounter; the patroller agent, controlling one or more patrol units, aims at the opposite. We model the problem as a two-player zero-sum game (termed transit game) and… (More)

We study the problem of optimal resource allocation for packet selection and inspection to detect potential threats in large computer networks with multiple computers of differing importance. An attacker tries to harm these targets by sending malicious packets from multiple entry points of the network; the defender thus needs to optimally allocate her… (More)

A number of real-world security scenarios can be cast as a problem of transiting an area guarded by a mobile patroller, where the transiting agent aims to choose its route so as to minimize the probability of encountering the patrolling agent, and vice versa. We model this problem as a two-player zero-sum game on a graph, termed the transit game. In… (More)

Developing scalable solution algorithms is one of the central problems in computational game theory. We present an iterative algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium for two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information. Our approach combines two key elements: (1) the compact sequence-form representation of extensive-form games… (More)

We study how a mobile defender should patrol an area to protect multiple valuable targets from being attacked by an attacker. In contrast to existing approaches, which assume stationary targets, we allow the targets to move through the area according to an a priori known, deterministic movement schedules. We represent the patrol area by a graph of arbitrary… (More)

A number of real-world security scenarios can be cast as a problem of transiting an area patrolled by a mobile adversary , where the transiting agent aims to choose its route so as to minimize the probability of encountering the patrolling agent, and vice versa. We model this problem as a two-player zero-sum game on a graph, termed the transit game. In… (More)

We investigate an iterative algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information. The approach uses the sequence-form representation of extensive-form games and the double-oracle algo-rithmic framework. The main idea is to restrict the game by allowing the players to play only some of the… (More)

We focus on network hardening with honeypots which could trap and expose the attacker. We model this problem as a general-sum extensive-form game with imperfect information. Based on a specific computer network, the defender seeks for an optimal deployment of honeypots while the attacker uses an attack plan from a library of possible attacks compactly… (More)