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Bounded Model Checking (BMC) has been recently introduced as an efficient verification method for reactive systems. BMC based on SAT methods consists in searching for a counterexample of a particular length and generating a propositional formula that is satisfiable iff such a counterexample exists. This new technique has been introduced by E. Clarke et al.… (More)
We present TECTLK, a logic to specify knowledge and real time in multi-agent systems. We show that the model checking problem is decidable, and we present an algorithm for TECTLK bounded model checking based on a discretisation method. We exemplify the use of the technique by means of the "Railroad Crossing System", a popular example in the multi-agent… (More)
The paper deals with the problem of checking reachability for timed automata. The main idea consists in combining the well-know forward reachability algorithm and the Bounded Model Checking (BMC) method. In order to check reachability of a state satisfying some desired property, first the transition relation of a timed automaton is unfolded iteratively to… (More)
We propose a framework for the verification of multi-agent systems' specification by symbolic model checking. The language CTLKD (an extension of CTL) allows for the representation of the temporal evolution of epistemic states of the agents, as well as their correct and incorrect functioning behaviour. We ground our analysis on the semantics of deontic… (More)
We present TCTLKD, a logic for knowledge, correctness and real time. TCTLKD is interpreted on real time deontic interpreted systems , and extension to continuous time of deontic interpreted systems. We exemplify the use of TCTLKD by discussing a variant of the " railroad crossing system " .
We examine a logic to reason about security protocols by means of temporal and epistemic concepts. We report results on completeness and decidability of the formalism as well as its expressiveness. As a case study we apply the formalism in the analysis of TESLA, a secure stream multi-cast protocol.