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Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition(More)
Human cooperation represents a spectacular outlier in the animal world. Unlike other creatures, humans frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. Experimental evidence and evolutionary models suggest that strong reciprocity, the(More)
Human cooperation in social dilemmas challenges researchers from various disciplines. Here we combine advances in experimental economics and evolutionary biology that separately have shown that costly punishment and reputation formation, respectively, induce cooperation in social dilemmas. The mechanisms of punishment and reputation, however, substantially(More)
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort. In(More)
Many important economic and political decisions are made by teams. In the economic literature, however, the decision units are frequently modeled as individual economic agents. The paper experimentally investigates the question to what extent observed team decisions under risk are actually consistent with the principles of rational choice, specifically the(More)
Recent developments in the study of social dilemmas have revealed various cooperative solutions of the "tragedy of the commons" problem. If the public goods game, i.e. the experimental paradigm of the tragedy of the commons, offers the opportunity to punish (the 'stick'), contributions to the public pool usually increase. Direct rewarding (the 'carrot') has(More)
In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms claims acquired in the past seem to create strong entitlements that shape current negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that(More)
Human societies are built on cooperation, especially on reciprocation — I help you and you help me, or I help you and someone else helps me. In the first case, help is directly reciprocated by help. In the second, called indirect reciprocity, I gain a good reputation and so I can expect help when in need. But how shall I treat someone with a bad reputation?(More)