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We introduce in this paper a technique in which we apply correlation analysis using only one execution power curve during an exponentiation to recover the whole secret exponent manipulated by the chip. As in the Big Mac attack from Walter, longer keys may facilitate this analysis and success will depend on the arithmetic coprocessor characteristics. We(More)
Power Analysis has been intensively studied since the first publications in 1996 and many related attacks on naive implementations have been proposed. Nowadays algorithms in tamper resistant devices are protected by different countermeasures most often based on data randomization such as the BRIP algorithm on ECC and its RSA derivative. However not all of(More)
In this paper we present a new approach to attacking a modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication based by distinguishing multiplications from squaring operations using the instantaneous power consumption. Previous approaches have been able to distinguish these operations based on information of the specific implementation of the embedded algorithm or(More)
The recent results presented by Moradi et al. on AES at CHES 2010 and Witteman et al. on square-and-multiply always RSA exponentiation at CT-RSA 2011 have shown that collision-correlation power analysis is able to recover the secret keys on embedded implementations. However, we noticed that the attack published last year by Moradi et al. is not efficient on(More)
Power Analysis has been deeply studied since 1998 in order to improve the security of tamper resistant products such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The study has evolved from initial basic techniques like simple and differential power analysis to more complex models such as correlation. However, works on correlation techniques have essentially been(More)
Embedded exponentiation techniques have become a key concern for security and efficiency in hardware devices using public key cryptography. An exponentiation is basically a sequence of multiplications and squarings, but this sequence may reveal exponent bits to an attacker on an unprotected implementation. Although this subject has been covered for years,(More)
Side-channel analysis is a well-known and efficient hardware technique to recover embedded secrets in microprocessors. Over the past years, the state-of-the-art side-channel attacks has significantly increased, leading to a myriad of vulnerability paths that secure codes must withstand. Nowadays most of the attacks target the cryptographic algorithms, but(More)