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Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO
How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? The authors offer an answer based on a model in which board…
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
The authors identify the primary findings of the empirical literature on boards of directors. Typically, these studies have sought to answer one of the following questions: How are the…
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The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance
This paper examines the relationship between top management compensation and corporate performance in public utilities. Previous researchers have argued that incentives for profitability are not…
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The Determinants of Board Composition
We identify factors that lead to changes among corporate directors. We hypothesize that the CEO succession process and firm performance will affect board composition. Our findings are consistent with…
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Trends in Corporate Governance
The popular press and scholarly studies have noted a number of trends in corporate governance. This article addresses, from a theoretical perspective, whether these trends are linked. And, if so,…
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Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example
This paper explores leadership within organizations. Leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary rather than coerced activity of the followers. This paper…
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Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
In public-policy discussions about corporate disclosure, more is typically judged better than less. In particular, better disclosure is seen as a way to reduce the agency problems that plague firms.…
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The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework & Survey
This paper is a survey of the literature on boards of directors, with an emphasis on research done subsequent to the Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey. The two questions most asked about boards are…
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Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
The authors examine the effects of renegotiation in an agency relationship. They show how renegotiation affects (1) the set of actions the principal can induce the agent to take and (2) the cost of…
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The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior
Economists presume that competition spurs a firm to be more efficient by forcing it to reduce its agency problems. This article investigates this presumption. It finds that the effects of competition…
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