I am grateful to Bob Sugden for many helpful discussions and for several suggestions that have substantially improved this paper. I am also grateful to Maria Montero, to the Associate Editor, and to two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Any errors are mine. Abstract The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its… (More)
We characterize the Extended, Generalized Shapley Value of McQuillin  using an 'efficiency' condition and two 'balance' conditions. One feature of this charateriza-tion is that the conditions only have to apply for a single game.
We propose a new type of cooperative game-a game in transition function (TF) form-as a means of representing social decision making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells us (where the EF form does not) about the alienability of a right. We… (More)