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The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a partition functionoutcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by… (More)
We characterize the Extended, Generalized Shapley Value of McQuillin  using an ‘efficiency’ condition and two ‘balance’ conditions. One feature of this charaterization is that the conditions only have to apply for a single game.
We propose a new type of cooperative game a game in transition function (TF) form as a means of representing social decision making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells us (where the EF form does not) about the alienability of a right. We… (More)