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This is a paper on the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in " inter-generational games ". In these games a sequence of non-overlapping " generations " of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t(More)
In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by(More)
Subjects played strategically similar 4 = 4 and 6 = 6 constant sum games under varying payoff scales. Substantial divergences from equilibrium predictions were exhibited. The dynamic pattern of play is best explained by a stimulus learning model whereby players allocate weight to different actions according to their Ž. relative time average payoff(More)
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the ÔMinimum Effort GameÕ which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game.(More)
We present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous-time low-information setting. For a dominance solvable version of a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, we find little evidence of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In an asynchronous setting, characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies, play(More)
This paper investigates the development of conventions of trust in what we call intergenerational games, i.e., games played by a sequence of non-overplapping agents, who pass on advice on how to play the game across adjacent generations of players. Using the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) as our experimental decision problem, advice seems to decrease the(More)
We conduct an experiment to investigate the degree to which deviations from exponential discounting can be accounted for by the hypothesis of hyperbolic discounting. Subjects are asked to choose between an earlier or later payoff in a series of 40 choice questions. Each question consists of a pair of monetary amounts determined by compounding a given base(More)
The present study attempts to connect cooperative behavior in the repeated play prisoner's dilemma (RPPD) with ''trusting'' and ''reciprocal'' behavior. Our goal is to see if people with different propensities to cooperate exhibit differing degrees of trust and reciprocity. We find the subjects who choose to cooperate in a RPPD game exhibit higher levels of(More)
This is a paper on the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in " inter-generational games ". In these games a sequence of non-overlapping " generations " of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t(More)