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Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
TLDR
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. Expand
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The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design
TLDR
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem - a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. Expand
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Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests
TLDR
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design and compare them with conventional procurement. Expand
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Towards Optimal Algorithms for Prediction with Expert Advice
TLDR
We study the classical problem of prediction with expert advice in the adversarial setting with a geometric stopping time and show that the optimal algorithm is not only optimal against this particular randomized adversary, but also minimax optimal. Expand
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Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems
TLDR
We present algorithms for a class of resource allocation problems both in the online setting with stochastic input and in the offline setting. Expand
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Improved Approximations for Free-Order Prophets and Second-Price Auctions
TLDR
We study the fundamental problem of selling a single indivisible item to one of $n$ buyers with independent and potentially nonidentical value distributions. Expand
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Optimal crowdsourcing contests
TLDR
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Expand
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Testing Incentive Compatibility in Display Ad Auctions
TLDR
We propose a simple experimental design where the advertiser randomly shades her value for the impression by some discrete fraction (10%, 20%, etc.), and then verifies that the slice of traffic that saw no shading yields the highest surplus. Expand
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Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents withExpand
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Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
TLDR
This article surveys recent work with an algorithmic flavor in Bayesian mechanism design in economic settings with multi-dimensional preferences. Expand
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