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The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
This essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions. The model
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
We interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated-game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security
The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had many different meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect
Federalism as a commit-ment to preserving market incentives
We advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Our approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
In the last decade multidimensional voting models have become subtle and complex instruments for explicating social choices by majority rule. What has been learned from them is that little will be
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
This paper presents a modification of the theory of the legislature which retains the assumption of self-interested maximizing behavior, but yields predictions consistent with empirical observation.
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
This paper extends Stigler and Peltzman's approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature. The model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications. The paper then tests
The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
ConclusionThis paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions. My thesis is twofold. First, because much of the previous evidence on
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization
This paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions, often approaching unanimous size, in the realm of distributive policies. Distributive policies are those which