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The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
- B. Weingast, K. Shepsle, C. Johnsen
- EconomicsJournal of Political Economy
- 1 August 1981
This essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions. The model…
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
- A. Greif, P. Milgrom, B. Weingast
- Economics, HistoryJournal of Political Economy
- 1 August 1994
We interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated-game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security…
The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
- B. Weingast, D. Wittman
- Economics
- 19 October 2006
Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had many different meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of…
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
- B. Weingast, William J. Marshall
- EconomicsJournal of Political Economy
- 1 February 1988
This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect…
Federalism as a commit-ment to preserving market incentives
- Y. Quian, B. Weingast
- Economics
- 1997
We advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Our approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved…
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
- K. Shepsle, B. Weingast
- Economics
- 1 February 1984
In the last decade multidimensional voting models have become subtle and complex instruments for explicating social choices by majority rule. What has been learned from them is that little will be…
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
- B. Weingast
- Economics
- 1 May 1979
This paper presents a modification of the theory of the legislature which retains the assumption of self-interested maximizing behavior, but yields predictions consistent with empirical observation.…
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
- B. Weingast, M. J. Moran
- EconomicsJournal of Political Economy
- 1 October 1983
This paper extends Stigler and Peltzman's approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature. The model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications. The paper then tests…
The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
- B. Weingast
- Economics
- 1984
ConclusionThis paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions. My thesis is twofold. First, because much of the previous evidence on…
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization
- K. Shepsle, B. Weingast
- Economics
- 1 February 1981
This paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions, often approaching unanimous size, in the realm of distributive policies. Distributive policies are those which…
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