• Publications
  • Influence
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies and imperfect information. These compensation schemes have desirableExpand
Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
We present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products. The central result provides general conditions under whichExpand
Bundling as an Entry Barrier
In this paper we look at the case for bundHng in an oHgopohstic environment. We show that bundhng is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, AExpand
Conservatism And Auditor-Client Negotiations
This paper examines an auditor's incentives to take actions that lead to objective financial statements. Our results challenge the common perception that auditors are conservative. Under GenerallyExpand
The Right Game: Use Game Theory to Shape Strategy
Since 1922, "Harvard Business Review" has been a leading source of breakthrough management ideas - many of which still speak to and influence us today. "The Harvard Business Review Classics" seriesExpand
Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good
Many public goods typically are supplied by the efforts of a single individual. A purely selfinterested agent could provide a public good if his own participation in the benefits justifies his cost.Expand
Credible Pretrial Negotiation
Pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information. When a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages, he may first attempt to reach aExpand
The Devolution of Declining Industries
In declining industries capacity must be reduced in order to restore profitability. Who bears this burden? Where production is all or nothing, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium: theExpand
Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
A celebrated result of Black (1984a) demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when preferences are single-peaked. The social choice follows the preferences of the median voter's mostExpand
Follow The Leader: Theory And Evidence On Political Participation
This paper presents an empirical and theoretical investigation of the strategic components to political participation. Using state-by-state voting data for the eleven U.S. Presidential elections,Expand