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  • Influence
Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time
TLDR
We address the algorithmic problem of finding a set of k initial seed nodes in a network so that the expected size of the resulting cascade is maximized, under the standard independent cascade model of network diffusion. Expand
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Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
TLDR
We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. Expand
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Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
TLDR
We study the efficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of simultaneous first- and second-price auctions when bidders have complement-free (a.k.a. subadditive) valuations. Expand
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A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
TLDR
We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. Expand
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Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
TLDR
We study mechanisms for utilitarian combinatorial allocation problems, where agents are not assumed to be single-minded. Expand
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Robust Optimization for Non-Convex Objectives
TLDR
We develop a reduction from robust improper optimization to Bayesian optimization: given an oracle that returns $\alpha$-approximate solutions for distributions over objectives, we compute a distribution over solutions that is $\alpha$. Expand
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Dynamic Pricing and Traffic Engineering for Timely Inter-Datacenter Transfers
TLDR
We design and evaluate Pretium -- a framework that combines dynamic pricing with traffic engineering for inter-datacenter bandwidth. Expand
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Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments
TLDR
We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. Expand
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Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets
TLDR
In this paper we present a threshold-based algorithm for the prophet inequality with n iid distributions and show that our algorithm is a 0.738-approximation algorithm. Expand
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Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
TLDR
This paper gives the first mechanism that outperforms the second price auction in Bulow and Klemperer's setting. Expand
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