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Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction
What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments ofExpand
Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck
This article defends the view that knowledge is type-identical to cognitive achievement. I argue, pace Duncan Pritchard, that not only knowledge, but also cognitive achievement is incompatible withExpand
Varieties of cognitive achievement
According to robust virtue epistemology (RVE), knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the (alleged)Expand
Against Swamping
The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g.Expand
The Rules of Thought
PART I: PROPOSITIONS, FREGEAN SENSE, AND RATIONAL MODALITY PART II: RATIONALITY, APRIORITY, AND PHILOSOPHY PART III: INTUITIONS AND PHILOSOPHY
EPISTEMOLOGY AND RADICALLY EXTENDED COGNITION
Abstract This paper concerns the relationship between epistemology and radically extended cognition. Radically extended cognition (REC) – as advanced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers – is cognitionExpand
Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind
'Knowledge-First' constitutes what is widely regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the past 25 years. Knowledge-first epistemology is the idea thatExpand
Belief without credence
TLDR
It is claimed that belief may not be enough to register all aspects of a subject’s epistemic position with respect to any given proposition, and this problem can be solved by introducing other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations—that differ in strength from belief. Expand
Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge
How do we know what’s (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. ForExpand
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