• Publications
  • Influence
Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
A common view of CEO compensation is that there is essentially no correlation between firm performance and CEO pay. This calls into question an important component of effective corporate governance.Expand
  • 1,927
  • 169
  • PDF
Stock Options for Undiversified Executives
We employ a certainty-equivalence framework to analyze the cost and value of, and pay/performance incentives provided by, non-tradable options held by undiversified, risk-averse executives. We deriveExpand
  • 1,146
  • 134
  • PDF
CEO Incentives and Firm Size
What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in payExpand
  • 519
  • 73
  • PDF
Do Executive Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking?
Executive stock options create incentives for executives to manage firms in ways that maximize firm market value. Since options increase in value with the volatility of the underlying stock,Expand
  • 142
  • 14
  • PDF
How Has the Basle Accord Affected Bank Portfolios
Abstract This paper investigates the extent to which the risk-based capital standards, which took effect in 1989, have affected commercial bank portfolios. The new standards give banks an incentiveExpand
  • 115
  • 11
The Taxation of Executive Compensation
Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive compensation paid through stock options. We examine the extent to which tax policy has influenced the compositionExpand
  • 188
  • 10
  • PDF
Fear of missing out, need for touch, anxiety and depression are related to problematic smartphone use
TLDR
Problematic smartphone use is an important public health challenge and is linked with poor mental health outcomes. Expand
  • 260
  • 9
  • PDF
The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options
Detailed data about stock option contracts are used to measure and analyze the pay to performance incentives of executive stock options. Two main issues are addressed. The first is the pay toExpand
  • 71
  • 5
Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay-to-Performance Sensitivities
We empirically analyze the dynamics of executives' pay-to-performance sensitivities. Option pay-to-performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater, often leading to pressures toExpand
  • 62
  • 5
  • PDF
Regulatory Free Cash Flow and the High Cost of Insurance Company Failures
Why is the cost of resolving insurance company failures so high? Evidence in this paper suggests that the state insurance regulatory bodies in charge of the liquidation process turn over an averageExpand
  • 20
  • 5