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Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- B. Bernheim, M. Whinston
- Economics
- 1 February 1986
In many examples of competitive bidding (e.g., government construction contracting) the relevant object is either partially divisible or ill-defined, in contrast to much of the recent theoretical…
A Theory of Conformity
- B. Bernheim
- EconomicsJournal of Political Economy
- 1 October 1994
This paper analyzes a model of social interaction in which individuals care about status as well as "intrinsic" utility (which refers to utility derived directly from consumption). Status is assumed…
Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior
- B. Bernheim, M. Whinston
- Economics
- 21 January 1990
Traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internal features such as demand conditions, concentration, and barriers-to-entry.…
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- B. Bernheim
- Economics
- 1 July 1984
THE NOTION OF EQUILIBRIUM proposed by Nash [19] has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games. While analyses of Nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to…
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
- B. Bernheim, B. Peleg, M. Whinston
- Economics
- 1 June 1987
Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
- L. Bagwell, B. Bernheim
- Economics, Business
- 1996
The authors examine conditions under which 'Veblen effects' arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption. While Veblen effects cannot ordinarily…
Exclusive Dealing
- B. Bernheim, M. Whinston
- EconomicsJournal of Political Economy
- 1 July 1996
In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we…
How Strong Are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities
- B. Bernheim
- EconomicsJournal of Political Economy
- 1 April 1989
This paper presents new empirical evidence in support of the view that a significant fraction of total saving is motivated by the desire to leave bequests. Specifically, I find that social security…
The Strategic Bequest Motive
- B. Bernheim, A. Shleifer, L. Summers
- EconomicsJournal of Labor Economics
- 1 July 1986
Although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation, our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete. We develop a…
Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics
- B. Bernheim, A. Rangel
- Economics
- 1 January 2008
We propose a broad generalization of standard choice-theoretic welfare economics that encompasses a wide variety of nonstandard behavioral models. Our approach exploits the coherent aspects of choice…
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