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Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency,(More)
I study strategy-proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects. A stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments, and mechanisms are compared according to first-order stochastic dominance. I show that non-wasteful strategy-proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy-proof(More)
Stability is often the goal for clearinghouses in matching markets, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. Stable outcomes absent transfers need not be utilitarian e¢ cient, suggesting the potential value of transfers. We study the wedge between stability and e¢ ciency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable(More)
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