Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi

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We prove that every multi-player perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.(More)
Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgameperfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel measurable payoffs, by providing a counter-example. We also consider a refinement called(More)
Stopping games (without simultaneous stopping) are sequential games in which at every stage one of the players is chosen according to a stochastic process, and that player decides whether to continue the interaction or stop it, whereby the terminal payoff vector is obtained by another stochastic process. We prove that if the payoff process is integrable, a(More)
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