Athanasios Papakonstantinou

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This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly forecast of a future event (such as a meteorological phenomenon) or a probabilistic estimate of a specific parameter (such as the quality of an expected service), with a specified minimum precision, from one or(More)
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estimate or forecast of a specified precision and report it truthfully to a centre. Our mechanism is applied in a setting where the centre is faced with multiple agents, and has no(More)
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of producing a probabilistic estimate of any precision, up to a(More)
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING, SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS SCHOOL OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE Doctor of Philosophy by Athanasios Papakonstantinou Citizen sensor networks are open information systems in which members of the public act as information providers. The information distributed in such networks ranges from observations of events (e.g. noise(More)
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