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A game is introduced and experimented that allows for a direct comparison of the two predominant equilibrium concepts of economic theory: the competitive versus the strategic equilibrium. Neither of the two extreme and completely disjoint equilibrium predictions fully explains the data. Observed outcomes, however, are closer to the competitive than the(More)
Epistemologists of testimony widely agree on the fact that our reliance on other people's testimony is extensive. However, they have not always paid enough attention to the fact that our reliance on testimony is not only extensive, but also varied. That is, there is more than one way in which we can rely on a speaker's testimony to form a belief: Sometimes(More)
We introduce and experiment the Fisherman's Game in which the application of economic theory leads to four different benchmarks. Non-cooperative sequential rationality predicts one extreme outcome while the core (which coincides with the competitive market equilibrium) predicts the other extreme. Intermediate, disjoint outcomes are predicted by fairness(More)
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