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- Nadja Betzler, Arkadii M. Slinko, Johannes Uhlmann
- J. Artif. Intell. Res.
- 2013

We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the “sum of misrepresentations” is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of… (More)

- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
- AAMAS
- 2010

A voting rule is an algorithm for determining the winner in an election, and there are several approaches that have been used to justify the proposed rules. One justification is to show that a rule satisfies a set of desirable axioms that uniquely identify it. Another is to show that the calculation that it performs is actually maximum likelihood estimation… (More)

- Denis R. Hirschfeldt, Bakhadyr Khoussainov, Richard A. Shore, Arkadii M. Slinko
- Ann. Pure Appl. Logic
- 2002

Whenever a structure with a particularly interesting computability-theoretic property is found, it is natural to ask whether similar examples can be found within well-known classes of algebraic structures, such as groups, rings, lattices, and so forth. One way to give positive answers to this question is to adapt the original proof to the new setting.… (More)

- Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
- IJCAI
- 2013

We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination underMonroe’s and ChamberlinCourant’s multiwinner voting rules, where we focus on the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters (the utilitarian case) or the (dis)satisfaction of the worstoff voter (the egalitarian case). We show good approximation algorithms for the satisfaction-based utilitarian… (More)

1 Department of Combinatorics and Optimization University of Waterloo, Canada (e-mail: r3christ@math.uwaterloo.ca) 2 Parameterized Complexity Research Unit, University of Newcastle, Australia (e-mail: Michael.Fellows@newcastle.edu.au) 3 Parameterized Complexity Research Unit, University of Newcastle, Australia (e-mail: Frances.Rosamond@newcastle.edu.au) 4… (More)

- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
- TARK
- 2009

The concept of <i>distance rationalizability</i> has several applications within social choice. In the context of voting, it allows one to define ("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class (roughly, a set of elections in which it is obvious who should win) and a distance function: namely, a candidate is said to be an election winner if it is ranked… (More)

- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
- SAGT
- 2009

In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is asked to implement. Specifically, in our model… (More)

When a number of like-minded voters vote strategically and have limited abilities to communicate the under and overshooting may occur when too few or too many of them vote insincerely. In this paper we discuss this phenomenon and define the concept of a safe strategic vote. We prove that for any onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule there exist a… (More)

- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
- AAAI
- 2010

We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by one or more clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote with the block of c’s clones. The outcome of the resulting election may then depend on how each voter orders the… (More)

- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
- AAAI
- 2010

We explore the relationship between two approaches to rationalizing voting rules: the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) framework originally suggested by Condorcet and recently studied in (Conitzer and Sandholm 2005; Conitzer, Rognlie, and Xia 2009) and the distance rationalizability (DR) framework (Meskanen and Nurmi 2008; Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko… (More)