#### Filter Results:

#### Publication Year

2004

2016

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Publication Venue

#### Key Phrases

Learn More

It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general p-balancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural… (More)

We adapt the classical core concept to deal with situations involving time and uncertainty. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved upon by any coalition after the resolution of uncertainty. We restrict ourselves to credible deviations, where a… (More)

Our work contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining by providing additional non-cooperative support to the well-known Nash bargaining solution. In particular, in the present paper we study a model of non-cooperative multilateral bargaining with a very general proposer selection protocol and set of feasible payoffs. In each period of the… (More)

This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model to the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining protocol is natural and has as its main feature that the players' shares in the cake are determined sequentially. The bargaining protocol requires unanimous agreement for proposals to be implemented.… (More)

I consider n–person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non–empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i's own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are… (More)

We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The identity of the proposer is determined by a general Markov process and the acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of it by all the players. We show that for every value of the continuation probability below one the subgame perfect equilibrium in… (More)

- Volker Britz, Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
- 2010

1 The authors would like to thank Jacques Drèze for helpful comments and suggestions. Abstract Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner's time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the… (More)