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It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general p-balancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural… (More)

We adapt the classical core concept to deal with situations involving time and uncertainty. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved upon by any coalition after the resolution of uncertainty. We restrict ourselves to credible deviations, where a… (More)

We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the… (More)

This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model to the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining protocol is natural and has as its main feature that the players' shares in the cake are determined sequentially. The bargaining protocol requires unanimous agreement for proposals to be implemented.… (More)

I consider n–person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non–empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i's own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are… (More)

We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The identity of the proposer is determined by a general Markov process and the acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of it by all the players. We show that for every value of the continuation probability below one the subgame perfect equilibrium in… (More)