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- Arkadi Predtetchinski
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2007

Infinite time horizon stationary cooperative games are considered where at each date the instantaneous NTU-game is determined by the state of nature. The strong sequential core selects those utility streams that no coalition can improve upon by deviating at any moment in time. The main result of the paper states that the strong sequential core is non-empty… (More)

- Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
- J. Economic Theory
- 2004

It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pbalancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural… (More)

- Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski
- J. Economic Theory
- 2010

Our work contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining by providing additional non-cooperative support to the well-known Nash bargaining solution. In particular, in the present paper we study a model of non-cooperative multilateral bargaining with a very general proposer selection protocol and set of feasible payoffs. In each period of the… (More)

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski
- J. Economic Theory
- 2010

We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The identity of the proposer is determined by a general Markov process and the acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of it by all the players. We show that for every value of the continuation probability below one the subgame perfect equilibrium in… (More)

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2012

This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-St̊ahl bargaining model to the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining protocol is natural and has as its main feature that the players’ shares in the cake are determined sequentially. The bargaining protocol requires unanimous agreement for proposals to be implemented.… (More)

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski, A. Perea
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2006

We adapt the classical core concept to deal with situations involving time and uncertainty. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved upon by any coalition after the resolution of uncertainty. We restrict ourselves to credible deviations, where a… (More)

- Arkadi Predtetchinski, Jean-Jacques Herings, Hans Peters
- 2002

Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered in which information is released over in nite time. The strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption processes where no coalition of agents wishes to deviate at any moment for the rest of time. Comparable to the optimality principle in dynamic programming, necessary and… (More)

This note provides a new proof of the non–emptiness of the fuzzy core in a pure exchange economy with finitely many agents. The proof is based on the concept of (Π, β)–balanced core for games without side payments due to Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003). JEL classification codes: D51, C71.

- Arkadi Predtetchinski
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2009

I consider n–person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non–empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i’s own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are… (More)

- Nizar Allouch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2008

The seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf [4] connects the two concepts of core and competitive equilibrium in exchange economies. In effect, their core-equilibrium equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is replicated, the set of core allocations of the replica economy shrinks to the set of competitive allocations. Florenzano [6]… (More)