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We study a mechanism design version of matching computation in graphs that models the game played by hospitals participating in pairwise kidney exchange programs. We present a new randomized matching mechanism for two agents which is truthful in expectation and has an approximation ratio of 3/2 to the maximum cardinality matching. This is an improvement… (More)

We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the problem. We prove that the approximation ratio of random priority is Θ(n −1/2) while no… (More)

The Fisher market model is one of the most fundamental resource allocation models in economics. In a Fisher market, the prices and allocations of goods are determined according to the preferences and budgets of buyers to clear the market. In a Fisher market game, however, buyers are strategic and report their preferences over goods; the market-clearing… (More)

We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization under general cardinal preferences on a finite number of alternatives and without money. The well-known range voting scheme can be thought of as a non-truthful mechanism for exact social welfare maximization in this setting. With m being the number of… (More)

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We observe that double-peaked preferences capture real-life scenarios and thus complement the well-studied notion of single-peaked… (More)

We study the envy-free pricing problem in multi-unit markets with budgets, where there is a seller who brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. Our goal is to compute an envy-free (item) price and allocation, i.e. an outcome where all the demands of the buyers are met given their budget constraints, which additionally… (More)

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the fundamental problem of social welfare maximization in one-sided matching settings, when agents have general cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. We consider both the complete and incomplete information settings and show that the two most well-studied mechanisms in literature, Probabilistic… (More)

We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envy-freeness, and… (More)

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We observe that double-peaked preferences capture real-life scenarios and thus complement the well-studied notion of single-peaked… (More)