Ariel D. Procaccia

Publications235
h-index53
Citations8,057
Highly Influential Citations661
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Variational Dropout and the Local Reparameterization Trick
TLDR
We explore an as yet unexploited opportunity for drastically improving the efficiency of stochastic gradient variational Bayes with global parameters by translating uncertainty about global parameters into local noise that is independent across datapoints in the minibatch. Expand
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Approximate mechanism design without money
TLDR
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot be applied efficiently. Expand
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The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
TLDR
The maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution --- which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities --- is known to provide outstanding fairness guarantees when allocating divisible goods. Expand
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On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
TLDR
We demonstrate that winner selection in two prominent proportional representation voting systems is a computationally intractable problem—implying that these systems are impractical when the assembly is large. Expand
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Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares
TLDR
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, focusing on a recently-introduced notion of fairness called maximin share guarantee: Each player's value for his allocation should be at least as high as what he can guarantee by dividing the items into as many bundles as there are players and receiving his least desirable bundle. Expand
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Truth, justice, and cake cutting
TLDR
We design both deterministic and randomized cake cutting algorithms that are truthful and fair under different assumptions with respect to the valuation functions of the agents. Expand
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Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot be applied… Expand
  • 102
  • 16
A note on competitive diffusion through social networks
TLDR
We introduce a game-theoretic model of diffusion of technologies, advertisements, or influence through a social network. Expand
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  • PDF
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
TLDR
The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. Expand
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No agent left behind: dynamic fair division of multiple resources
TLDR
We develop a dynamic model of fair division, and propose desirable axiomatic properties for dynamic resource allocation mechanisms. Expand
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