Arianna Degan

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We provide new results regarding the identification of peer effects. We consider an extended version of the linear-in-means model where each individual has his own specific reference group. Interactions are thus structured through a social network. We assume that correlated unobservables are either absent, or treated as fixed effects at the component level.(More)
In this paper we address the following questions: (i) To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? And (ii) in environments where the hypothesis is falsifiable, to what extent is the observed behavior of voters consistent with sincere voting? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election,(More)
Why do some dynasties maintain the fortune of their founders while others completely squander it in few generations? To address this question, we use a simple deterministic microfounded model based on two main elements: the “hunger for accumulation” and the “willingness to exert effort”. Contrary to models with capital market imperfections, our setting(More)
This paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical setting combines an “uncertain-voter” model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior. We apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in U.S. presidential and congressional elections. We structurally estimate the model using(More)
In this paper, we measure the welfare costs/gains associated with financial market incompleteness in a monetary union. To do this, we build on a two-country model of a monetary union with sticky prices subject to asymmetric productivity shocks. For most plausible values of price stickiness, we show that asymmetric shocks under incomplete financial markets(More)
We propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting which incorporates the three main factors affecting voting choices of individual citizens: party identification, policy preferences and candidates’ valence. Using individual level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections we identify and estimate (1) the distribution of voters’(More)
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