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Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders;Expand
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Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*
This paper empirically examines whether certain corporate governance mechanisms are related to the probability of a company restating its earnings. We examine a sample of 159 U.S. public companiesExpand
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Anomalies or illusions? Evidence from stock markets in eighteen countries
Abstract This paper examines five seasonal patterns in stock markets of eighteen countries: the weekend, turn-of-the-month, end-of-December, monthly and Friday-the-thirteenth effects. We find a dailyExpand
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The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly
The existing literature on the post-merger performance of acquiring firms is divided. The authors reexamine this issue, using a nearly exhaustive sample of mergers between NYSE acquirers andExpand
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Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?*
If outside directors with backgrounds in politics and in law play a political role, they will be more important on the boards of firms for which politics matters more. We conduct three tests. First,Expand
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The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle
While the bulk of the research on the financial performance of mergers and acquisitions has focused on stock returns around the merger announcement, a surprisingly, large set of papers has alsoExpand
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Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and
This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between man? agers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders;Expand
  • 151
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Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions
This paper examines the relationship between common stock and option holdings of managers and the choice of investment and financing decisions by firms. The authors find support for the hypothesis ofExpand
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Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments
This paper examines the role of large shareholders in monitoring managers when they propose antitakeover charter amendments. We attempt to distinguish between two competing hypotheses: the “activeExpand
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Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud*
Fraud scandals can create incentives to change managers in an attempt to improve the firm's performance, recover lost reputational capital, or limit the firm's exposure to liabilities that arise fromExpand
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