Antonio Romero-Medina

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This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. \Ve analyze sorne sequential rnechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one reallife matching markets. \Ve show that only cor,e allocations should be attained when agents act strategically faced váth these mechanisms. Two mechanisms implement(More)
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation game in which every player's payo® depends only on the members of her coalition. We provide three conditions under which the core of such games is non-empty. The three properties identi ̄ed are called Union Responsiveness, Intersection Responsiveness, and Essentiality. All three are restrictions on(More)
The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under(More)
A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an effective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to relevant equilibrium refinements. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous(More)
The paper seeks to fonnalize the notion of effective freedom or the freedom to realize meaningful choices. The definition of meaningful choice used in this paper is based on the preference orderings that a reasonable person may have. 1 argue that only alternatives that can be selected by a reasonable person from the set 01' all possible alternatiV'es(More)
This paper considers a family of admission mechanisms, with multiple applications and application costs. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. Without application costs and under incomplete information unstable allocations emerge. JEL Classi…cation: C78; D78
We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the …rst calls of the Program, an eligibility requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish research institution. This requirement was removed in the fourth call. We model the recruiting process as a(More)
We study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of freedom of choice. We propose a framework in which both the diversity of the options and the preferences of the agent over the options do play a role. We formulate some axioms that re°ect these two aspects of freedom and we study their logical implications. Two di®erent criteria for ranking sets(More)
Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians' Choices?* In this paper, we propose an alternative methodology for ranking hospitals based on the choices of Medical School graduates over hospital training vacancies. Our methodology is therefore a revealed preference approach. Our methodology for measuring relative hospital quality has the following(More)