Antonio Romero-Medina

Learn More
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation game in which every player's payo® depends only on the members of her coalition. We provide three conditions under which the core of such games is non-empty. The three properties identi¯ed are called Union Responsiveness, Intersection Responsiveness, and Essentiality. All three are restrictions on(More)
The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under(More)
A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an effective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to relevant equilibrium refinements. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous(More)
This paper considers a family of admission mechanisms, with multiple applications and application costs. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. Without application costs and under incomplete information unstable allocations emerge.
Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the Collegio Carlo Alberto. Abstract We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the …rst calls of the Program, an eligibility requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish(More)
This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to these features , the(More)
Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of aNash equilibriumand the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules.We then introduce generalized(More)