Anna von Heusinger

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We consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem which, in contrast to the standard Nash equilibrium problem, allows joint constraints of all players involved in the game. Using a regularized Nikaido-Isoda-function, we then present three optimization problems related to the generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The first optimization problem is a(More)
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is an extension of the standard Nash game where both the utility functions and the strategy spaces of each player also depend on the strategies chosen by all other players. This problem is rather difficult to solve, and there are only a few methods available in the literature. One of the most popular ones is(More)
We consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), where not only the players’ cost functions but also their strategy spaces depend on the rivals’ decision variables. Existence results for GNEPs are typically shown by using a fixed point argument for a certain set-valued function. Here we use a regularization of this set-valued function in order(More)
The generalized Nash equilibrium is a Nash game, where not only the players’ cost functions, but also the constraints of a player depend on the rival players decisions. We present a globally convergent algorithm that is suited for the computation of a normalized Nash equilibrium in the generalized Nash game with jointly convex constraints. The main tool is(More)
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem is a Nash game which, in contrast to the standard Nash equilibrium problem, allows the strategy sets of each player to depend on the decision variables of all other players. It was recently shown by the authors that this generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as both an unconstrained and a(More)
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem is a Nash game which, in contrast to the standard Nash equilibrium problem, allows the strategy sets of each player to depend on the decision variables of all other players. It was recently shown by the authors that this generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as both an unconstrained and a(More)
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