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No Match Point for the Permissibility Account
In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making itExpand
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Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
Kelly holds that epistemic rationality cannot be understood as a form of instrumental rationality, because an agent may lack the relevant cognitive goal while still being epistemically rational.Expand
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How to resolve doxastic disagreement
How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic stateExpand
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Evidential Probabilities and Credences
Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes aExpand
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Disagreement in a Group
No commitment to the truth
On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe suchExpand
2 The Ideal-Agent-Credence Interpretation 2 . 1 The Interpretation
Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes aExpand
Philosophical methods under scrutiny: introduction to the special issue philosophical methods
TLDR
This paper is the introduction to the Special Issue “Philosophical Methods”. Expand
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