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This paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal-agent models (compared to general implementation models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash(More)
Firms routinely decide whether to make essential inputs themselves or buy the inputs from independent suppliers. Conventional wisdom suggests that a firm will not buy an input for a price above its in-house cost of production. We show that this is not necessarily the case when a monopolistic input supplier also serves the firm's retail rival. In this case,(More)
Related parties in vertical relationships routinely have competing objectives. While conventional wisdom suggests that such frictions can be alleviated by centralized control, this paper demonstrates that decentralization and the tensions that arise in transfer pricing can help coordinate the decisions of affiliated firms. In particular, a vertically(More)
A criticism of mechanism design theory is that the optimal mechanism designed for one environment can produce drastically different actions, outcomes, and payoffs in a second, even slightly different, environment. In this sense, the theoretically optimal mechanisms usually studied are not "robust." In order to study robust mechanisms while maintaining an(More)
Taxes levied on retail sales are a ubiquitous form of taxation, both in the US and abroad. While considerable study has examined the economic effects of such sales taxes visa -vis consumer demand, surprisingly little attention has been focused on the effects up the supply chain. In this paper, we consider a parsimonious model of retail products sold in a(More)