Andrew T . Guzman

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This paper empirically investigates the determinants of firms’ decisions where to incorporate. We find that states that offer stronger antitakeover protections are substantially more successful both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-ofstate incorporations. We estimate that, compared with adopting no antitakeover statutes, adopting all(More)
This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within the World Trade Organization’s system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states(More)
The paper provides evidence on the impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) by examining a sample of initial public offerings from 1990 to 1999 facing a mix of Section 11 and Rule 10b-5 antifraud claims. Others have provided evidence that the PSLRA increased the significance of merit-related factors in determining the incidence(More)
The canonical law and economics view holds that corporate managers do and should have a duty to profit-maximize because such conduct is socially efficient given that general legal sanctions do or can redress any harm that corporate or noncorporate businesses inflict on others. Professor Elhauge argues that this canonical view is mistaken both descriptively(More)
Induction of mixed allogeneic chimerism is a promising approach for achieving donor-specific tolerance, thereby obviating the need for life-long immunosuppression for solid organ allograft acceptance. In mice receiving a low dose (3Gy) of total body irradiation, allogeneic bone marrow transplantation combined with anti-CD154 tolerizes peripheral CD4 and CD8(More)
Regime design choices in international law turn on empirical claims about how states behave and under what conditions their behavior changes. Substantial empirical evidence suggests Copyright © 2004 by Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks. † J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School. J.D., Yale Law(More)
This paper shows that elections are good for peace and that politicians’ fear of losing office is the reason why disputes between democracies are extremely rare. To examine the impact of electoral accountability on military conflicts, we construct a new dataset of executive term limits for a sample of 177 countries over the 1816-2001 period, and combine(More)