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We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players… (More)

We compare the number of active firms, i.e. the number of firms producing a positive quantity, in equilibrium across four different models of oligopoly: Cournot and Bertrand with homogeneous or differentiated goods. We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all… (More)

Oligopolies in which firms have different costs of production have been relatively understudied. In contrast to models with symmetric costs, some firms may be inactive in equilibrium. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric… (More)

- Andrew Ledvina, Ronnie Sircar
- Risk and Decision Analysis
- 2012

We study continuous time oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices or quantities. We study a deterministic version of the problem using an asymptotic expansion of the relevant HJB partial differential equations. We find in this setting that for firms with highly differentiated goods, the… (More)

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