Andrei Shleifer

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No. This paper investigates the relationship between financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivities by analyzing the firms identified by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen as having unusually high investment-cash flow sensitivities. We find that firms that appear less financially constrained exhibit significantly greater sensitivities than firms(More)
We present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The unpredictability of noise traders’ beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. As a(More)
We ..'.-.v~-qg~te the rehtionship between management ownerslEp and market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fo.qune ~ fu, ms, we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship. Tobin's Q firsA increases, then declines, and finally rises slighdy as ownership by the board of direc~ts rises. For older(More)
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-f low ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of(More)
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  • Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, +13 authors David Thesmar
  • 2006
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and(More)
Stock prices move together more in poor economies than in rich economies. This "nding is not due to market size and is only partially explained by higher fundamentals 0304-405X/00/$ see front matter ( 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 0 4 4 0 5 X ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 7 1 4 1At present, we only have a long panel of returns for the US. We(More)
  • Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, +4 authors Simon A Johnson
  • 1999
Recent research on corporate governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of financial markets, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both(More)