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- Andreas Tutic
- IGTR
- 2010

- André Casajus, Andreas Tutic
- Mathematical Social Sciences
- 2013

We introduce a weighted version of the component e¢ cient -value Casajus (2008, Games Econ Behav, forthcoming) for TU games with a coalition structure. This value can be viewed as the outcome of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to the playersproblem of distributing their componentsworth where the Shapley payo¤s serve as threat point. We provide… (More)

- Andreas Tutic, Harald Wiese
- Social Networks
- 2015

We employ concepts from graph theory and cooperative game theory to reconstruct Granovetter’s famous thesis concerning ‘the strength of weak ties’. In contrast to existing formal models related to this thesis, our approach captures the mechanisms Granovetter invokes in the derivation of his thesis. Notably, our model allows for an analytical distinction… (More)

- André Casajus, Lothar Tröger, Andreas Tutic
- 2008

We introduce and characterize a component efficient value for TU games with a cooperation structure which in contrast to the Myerson (1977, Math. Operations Res. 2: 225—229) value accounts for outside options. It is based on the idea that the distribution of the worth within a component should be consistent with some connected graph which reflects the… (More)

- Sascha Grehl, Andreas Tutić, MariaPaz Espinosa
- PloS one
- 2015

We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward induction and interactive knowledge. Besides reliable estimates of the cognitive skills of the subjects, our design allows us to disentangle two possible explanations for the observed limits in performed iterated reasoning: Restrictions in subjects' cognitive… (More)

Consider the following problem: There are four individuals differing with respect to two characteristics. First, Anne and Bob received a low bequest (1), while Ruth and Shmuel received a high bequest (3). Second, Anne and Ruth are females and as such show more dedication (3) than Bob and Shmuel (1) to the painstaking task of transforming money into utility.… (More)

We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player’s own inability to perform backward induction to be separated from the effects of her disbelief in the ability of others to do so.… (More)

- Andreas Tutic
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2015

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