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We introduce a weighted version of the component e¢ cient-value (Casajus 2009, Games Econ Behav 65, 49–61) for TU games with a coalition structure. We provide characterizations both for a symmetric and for an asymmetric treatment of outside options. Further, the stability of coalition structures is explored. These concepts are applied to apex games.
We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward induction and interactive knowledge. Besides reliable estimates of the cognitive skills of the subjects, our design allows us to disentangle two possible explanations for the observed limits in performed iterated reasoning: Restrictions in subjects' cognitive(More)
Keywords: Granovetter's thesis Weak ties Graph theory Cooperative game theory Gloves game a b s t r a c t We employ concepts from graph theory and cooperative game theory to reconstruct Granovetter's famous thesis concerning 'the strength of weak ties'. In contrast to existing formal models related to this thesis, our approach captures the mechanisms(More)
Consider the following problem: There are four individuals differing with respect to two characteristics. First, Anne and Bob received a low bequest (1), while Ruth and Shmuel received a high bequest (3). Second, Anne and Ruth are females and as such show more dedication (3) than Bob and Shmuel (1) to the painstaking task of transforming money into utility.(More)
We introduce and characterize a component efficient value for TU games with a cooperation structure which in contrast to the Myerson (1977, Math. Operations Res. 2: 225—229) value accounts for outside options. It is based on the idea that the distribution of the worth within a component should be consistent with some connected graph which reflects the(More)
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