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We introduce a weighted version of the component e¢ cient-value Casajus (2008, Games Econ Behav, forthcoming) for TU games with a coalition structure. This value can be viewed as the outcome of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to the players' problem of distributing their components'worth where the Shapley payo¤s serve as threat point. We provide(More)
We introduce and characterize a component efficient value for TU games with a cooperation structure which in contrast to the Myerson (1977, Math. Operations Res. 2: 225—229) value accounts for outside options. It is based on the idea that the distribution of the worth within a component should be consistent with some connected graph which reflects the(More)
Consider the following problem: There are four individuals differing with respect to two characteristics. First, Anne and Bob received a low bequest (1), while Ruth and Shmuel received a high bequest (3). Second, Anne and Ruth are females and as such show more dedication (3) than Bob and Shmuel (1) to the painstaking task of transforming money into utility.(More)
We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward induction and interactive knowledge. Besides reliable estimates of the cognitive skills of the subjects, our design allows us to disentangle two possible explanations for the observed limits in performed iterated reasoning: Restrictions in subjects' cognitive(More)
Keywords: Granovetter's thesis Weak ties Graph theory Cooperative game theory Gloves game a b s t r a c t We employ concepts from graph theory and cooperative game theory to reconstruct Granovetter's famous thesis concerning 'the strength of weak ties'. In contrast to existing formal models related to this thesis, our approach captures the mechanisms(More)
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