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We study various generalizations of the secretary problem with submodular objective functions. Generally, a set of requests is revealed step-by-step to an algorithm in random order. For each request, one option has to be selected so as to maximize a monotone submodular function while ensuring feasibility. For our results, we assume that we are given an(More)
We study packing LPs in an online model where the columns are presented to the algorithm in random order. This natural problem was investigated in various recent studies motivated, e.g., by online ad allocations and yield management where rows correspond to resources and columns to requests specifying demands for resources. Our main contribution is a 1 --(More)
We study online variants of weighted bipartite matching on graphs and hypergraphs. In our model for online matching, the vertices on the right-hand side of a bipartite graph are given in advance and the vertices on the left-hand side arrive online in random order. Whenever a vertex arrives, its adjacent edges with the corresponding weights are revealed and(More)
We consider the following online appointment scheduling problem: Jobs of different processing times and weights arrive online step-by-step. Upon arrival of a job, its (future) starting date has to be determined immediately and irrevocably before the next job arrives, with the objective of minimizing the average weighted completion time. In this type of(More)
The main goal of this seminar was to study topics related to electronic markets and auctions both from the computational perspective and from a game-theoretic and economic one. From the computer science perspective, with the advent of the Internet, there has been a significant amount of work in Algorithmic Game Theory focusing on computational aspects of(More)
We consider a variant of the stochastic secretary problem where applicants need to be hired over time. Upon arrival of each applicant their cost per time step is revealed, and we have to fix the duration of employment, starting immediately. This decision is irrevocable, i.e., we can neither extend a contract nor dismiss a candidate once hired. In every time(More)
The Temp Secretary Problem was recently introduced by Fiat et al. [11]. It is a generalization of the Secretary Problem, in which commitments are temporary for a fixed duration. We present a simple online algorithm with improved performance guarantees for cases already considered by Fiat et al. and give competitive ratios for new generalizations of the(More)
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